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TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES 
ON AN INTERNATIONAL AND STATE PLATFORM: 
A CONTROVERSIAL RESOLUTION 
TO NORTH DAKOTA’S DEVILS LAKE DILEMMA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The best that can be said of the U.S.-Canadian deal on Devils Lake is 
that it may prove better than no deal at all. 
Or it may not.”1 
 
The United States and Canada share a sweeping expanse of waterways 
that splash across the respective borders of both countries.2  Long before 
political boundaries were drawn separating the two nations, massive 
glaciers carved out what would later become some of the largest freshwater 
lakes in the world.3  Now, twenty thousand years after the last of these 
glaciers retreated, these lakes and waterways have become a critical turning 
point in international and state law.4  Attempts to resolve transboundary 
water disputes among parties of heterogeneous make-ups, including 
sovereign nations, states, and public and private groups, are proving to be 
increasingly complicated, necessitating the navigation of a myriad of laws, 
treaties, policies, and agreements in order to determine the applicable 
jurisdictional and legal framework to be used in their resolution.5 
The long-standing conflict between both the United States and Canada, 
as well as between North Dakota and Minnesota, over the ever-expanding 
Devils Lake in central North Dakota is an excellent example of such a 
multi-faceted transboundary dispute.6  It would be difficult to find a more 
complicated conflict involving so many different parties, jurisdictions, and 
 
1. Editorial, Devils Lake; Settlement Looks Like Surrender, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Aug. 11, 2005, at 16A. 
2. See John Knox, Federal, State and Provincial Interplay Regarding Cross-Border 
Environmental Pollution, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 199, 203 (2001) (explaining that Canada and the 
United States share a border approximately 5,000 miles long). 
3. See Kendall Hamilton & Kimberly Martineau, The 100-Year Forecast: Very Hot, and 
Stormy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1997, at 12 (explaining the change of weather patterns over time 
and its corollary effect on societal relationships). 
4. See Knox, supra note 2, at 203 (discussing the effects of transboundary pollution). 
5. Id. at 203-04. 
6. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A. 
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components of federal and state law.7  For more than fourteen years, 
attempts to curtail the expansion and flooding of Devils Lake have been a 
source of contention for the respective governments, as well as for many 
additional parties, both public and private.8  Not surprisingly, in spite of a 
recent agreement between the governments of Manitoba and North Dakota 
on August 5, 2005,9 that may lead, in substance, to a temporary resolution 
of the long-running Devils Lake dilemma,10 a residue of discontent remains 
for many of the engaged parties. 
This Note will provide a substantive review of the legal ramifications 
of international and state-level transboundary water disputes, with reference 
specifically to the flooding of Devils Lake.  The discussion involved in this 
Note will focus on the following: (1) the relevant environmental law 
legislation as applied on a state and federal level; (2) the controlling 
international treaty law; and (3) the possible ameliorative remedies of state 
nuisance law.  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s June 2005 decision in 
People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Department of 
Health (hereinafter People)11 will serve as the center point for the dis-
cussion of each area of law as it pertains to the case.  After considering the 
implications and/or applications of each area of law, this Note will analyze 
the rights and remedies of those substantive areas of law as they pertain to 
international and state transboundary water disputes.  Finally, this Note will 
attempt to justify the North Dakota Department of Health’s decision to 
build an outlet from Devils Lake into the nearby Sheyenne River to protect 
North Dakota’s citizens from harm, while at the same time outlining 
broader public policy issues inherent in making large-scale changes to our 
natural environment. 
 
 
 
7. See Knox, supra note 2, at 200-02 (indicating that despite the relative frequency of 
transboundary water pollution disputes, a situation involving multiple states, as well as both 
Canada and the United States, is an infrequent occurrence). 
8. Dean Rebuffoni, North Dakota Flood-Control Plan Is Under Fire, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), May 9, 1997, at 22A. 
9. Press Release, State of N.D., Office of the Governor, Joint Press Statement on Devils Lake 
Flooding and Ecological Protection by the United States and Canada, North Dakota, Minnesota, 
and Manitoba 1-2 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://governor.state.nd.us./media/news-
releases/2005/08/050806.html [hereinafter Press Release].  See generally Clifford Krauss, U.S. 
and Canada Reach Deal on Draining Lake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, § 1, at 17 (explaining the 
background and concept of the agreement). 
10. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1. 
11. 2005 ND 104, 697 N.W.2d 319. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE DEVILS LAKE DILEMMA 
A. RISING WATER AND FLOODS 
Devils Lake, with a surface area of over 125,000 acres, is the largest 
freshwater lake in North Dakota.12  As a part of the Hudson River Basin, 
the lake is located in an isolated ecosystem that allows for little or no 
natural drainage.13  Much like the Great Salt Lake in Utah, the lack of any 
natural outflow leads to high levels of salinity in the water.14  Additionally, 
the lake is prone to drastic variations in water levels.15  Since the 1990s, the 
lake has risen more than twenty-four feet, bringing water levels to their 
highest point since the 1830s,16 and expanding the surface area of the lake 
from seventy square miles to its current size of 125,000 acres.17 
The resulting flooding has destroyed over 80,000 acres of farmland, 
homes, and businesses.18  Consequently, the lake’s natural borders have 
increased to the point where they have begun to displace residents living 
outside the City of Devils Lake.19  In 1996, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency implemented a buyout program for many of the 
residents who lived in flooded areas.20  While some of the residents have 
 
12. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 2, 697 N.W.2d at 323. 
13. John Knox, Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on 
Multiple Actors in Canada–U.S. Relations: Cleveland, Ohio, April 16-18, 2004: Environment: 
Garrison Dam, Columbia River, The IJC, NGOS, 30 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 129, 130 (2004). 
14. See Sheryl A. Rosenberg, A Canadian Perspective on the Devils Lake Outlet: Towards 
an Environmental Assessment Model for Transboundary Disputes, 76 N.D. L. REV. 817, 821 
(2000) (providing a wealth of helpful information regarding the facts and issues of the conflict that 
took place, in large part, in the 1990s). 
15. Id. 
16. Id.  See also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CORPS FACTS: DEVILS LAKE, N.D. 
FLOOD REDUCTION PROJECT—OUTLET 1 (2005), available at http://www.mvp.usace.army. 
mil/docs/press/devilsoutlet.pdf [hereinafter U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS]. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), CLOSED BASIN LAKE 
FLOODING—INTERIM FINAL RULE, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/fnlrlcbl.shtm (last visited 
October 13, 2006)  [hereinafter FEMA Report].  The FEMA report explained the need for a 
federal buyout program: 
The conditions at Devils Lake Basin are unique because the lake is part of a "closed 
basin," that is, although it lies within the Red River-Hudson Bay drainage system, no 
water has flowed from the Devils Lake Basin in recorded history (since the 
1830s) . . . .  The runoff remains in these two lakes until it evaporates or enters the 
groundwater table . . . .  We (the Mitigation Division) are adding an endorsement to 
the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) that will establish a permanent procedure 
for honoring claims for buildings damaged by continuous lake flooding from closed 
basin lakes or under imminent threat of flood damage from those closed basin 
lakes . . . .  We estimate that, by being proactive, rather than waiting for an insured 
building to be inundated for 90 days by the rising lake levels, we have saved the 
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taken advantage of the program, many have remained despite the increased 
risks of flooding and the lack of any foreseeable improvement of the 
situation.21 
Since the beginning of the precipitous rise in lake water levels during 
the early 1990s, efforts to control water levels have cost the State of North 
Dakota and the federal government over $350 million in damage relief.22  In 
1993, the North Dakota Water Commission, in an effort to reduce the 
damage caused by frequent floods and rising water levels, asked the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter the Corps) to conduct a 
comprehensive study on the creation and cost of an outlet from Devils Lake 
to an outside body of water.23  The Corps began the study in 1997.24  The 
resulting plan was later approved in 2003.25  The Corps recommended the 
construction of an outlet at nearby Pelican Lake, which empties into the 
Sheyenne River, under the stipulation that North Dakota adhere to the 
Clean Water Act’s permit program26 and effluent limitations standards.27  
Furthermore, the Corps estimated that an additional $900 million in 
potential damages might occur if the lake continued to rise to the point of 
overflowing into the Sheyenne River,28 with the greatest impact falling on 
the City of Devils Lake and its surrounding highways.29  The cost of imple-
menting the Corps’ outlet plan was estimated to be around $200 million.30  
Despite the high cost, the Corps’ final integrated planning report states that 
 
program on average 25% for each claim in the Devils Lake area.  Paying in advance 
for these inevitable flood losses so that policyholders can use the claim proceeds to 
relocate their homes so that we can recover salvage simply makes the best public 
policy and insurance sense under the circumstances. 
Id. 
21. Id. 
22. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 16, at 1. 
23. Id. 
24. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 4, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 323. 
25. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT/ 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR DEVILS LAKE, NORTH DAKOTA, 1-4 (2003), 
available at http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/docs/14sp292recordofdec.pdf [hereinafter ARMY 
CORPS FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT].  The Army Corps’ plan was approved on the 
condition that North Dakota applied for and was granted a Clean Water Act § 1342 permit, and 
met effluent limitation standards of § 1311.  Id. 
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (explaining the state permit program and its require-
ments). 
27. See id. § 1311 (explaining the effluent limitation standards and requirements). 
28. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 16, at 1. 
29. Id. 
30. Knox, supra note 13, at 133. 
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the Corps’ plan “is the least environmentally damaging practicable outlet 
alternative.”31 
The Corps plan was never implemented.32  In 1999, the North Dakota 
Legislature passed a bill33 that effectively rejected the Corps plan in favor 
of a more cost-effective and immediate solution, allowing the construction 
of an outlet to the Sheyenne River which would cost the state under $30 
million to build.34  The Sheyenne River outlet will relieve pressure from the 
lake by pumping water from the lake to the Sheyenne River at a rate of 100 
cubic feet per second.35  This second plan remains controversial for a num-
ber of reasons, as illustrated in the arguments made by the adverse parties in 
People.36 
The recent ruling by the North Dakota Supreme Court in People effec-
tively closed the door on the likelihood of further litigation.37  In People, 
Manitoba, joined by two environmental interest groups,38 appealed the 
district court’s decision, which upheld the North Dakota Department of 
Health’s decision to grant the Water Commission a permit for the creation 
of the Sheyenne River outlet.39  The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected 
the argument that the Health Department failed to conduct the permit 
process in accordance with the law, and paid deference to the administrative 
agency’s decision-making process.40 
Explaining its decision, the court reasoned that the Health Department 
had conducted a permit hearing and received public comments concerning 
the outlet as required by law.41  Furthermore, applying the deferential “arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable” standard of review, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court also found that the Health Department had sufficiently con-
sidered and addressed the issues concerning the transfer of harmful biota 
from Devils Lake into the waters connected to the Sheyenne River outlet.42  
 
31. ARMY CORPS FINAL INTEGRATED PLANNING REPORT, supra note 25, at 4. 
32. Id. 
33. See Statewide Water Development Goals, 1999 N.D. Laws 535, § 3 (codified as N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 61-01-26.2 (2005)) (explaining the sources of funding for the Devils Lake outlet, 
and requiring approval by the North Dakota Water Commission for the project). 
34. Knox, supra note 13, at 134. 
35. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 14, ¶ 6, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 324. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323.  Manitoba was joined by two public interest parties: People 
to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. and the Peterson Coulee Outlet Association.  Id.  Additionally, 
the Minnesota Attorney General joined the appellants as Amicus Curiae.  Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. ¶ 38, 697 N.W.2d at 333. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. ¶ 37. 
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Though potentially harmful foreign biota were undoubtedly present within 
the “closed” water system of Devils Lake, the court deferred to the North 
Dakota Department of Health’s decision.43 
The decision in People, effectively paving the way for the construction 
of the proposed outlet,44 was followed by an agreement between North 
Dakota and Canada regarding the maintenance and construction of the 
outlet.45  On August 5, 2005, two months after the decision in People, 
Manitoba and North Dakota agreed to cooperate with the newly proposed 
design of the Devils Lake outlet, which put an end to the conflict, at least 
for Manitoba.46  While the negotiation efforts should be applauded, the 
agreement appears to leave Minnesota and other interested parties in the 
dark concerning further legal recourse.47 
B. THE CONFLICT: WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
It is commonly agreed by all parties involved that the situation at 
Devils Lake has reached critical proportions.48  The disagreement lies in the 
proposed solutions to this calamity.49  On one side stand the State of North 
Dakota and the federal government in the form of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.50  On 
the other side are the government of Manitoba, various American and 
Canadian public interest groups,51 and the State of Minnesota.52  The 
crossfire in the media has been palpable.53 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. 
45. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1. 
46. Id. 
47. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Knox, supra note 13, at 133.  Knox discusses the post held by former Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, and his decision that the North Dakota outlet plans would not violate the Boundary 
Waters Treaty, which naturally pleased Governor John Hoeven.  Id.  As of the writing of this 
Note, the current Secretary of State is Condoleezza Rice.  U.S. Dep’t of State, http:// 
www.state.gov/secretary/ (last visited April 30, 2006). 
51. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 1, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 323. 
52. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 1, People to Save the Sheyenne River, 2005 ND 104, 697 N.W.2d 319 
(No. 20040376).  The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency, and the Minnesota Attorney General appeared as Amici Curiae to argue that the 
Sheyenne River outlet would result in the transfer of potentially harmful biota and invasive 
parasites to Minnesota waterways, which would violate Minnesota water quality standards.  Id. at 
8-11. 
53. See Frank McKenna, Hell from High Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at A27. 
Ambassador McKenna’s position summarized the concerns of Manitoba and Canada, stating, “In 
Canada, we are sympathetic to the plight of the lake’s neighbors, but not to the solution their state 
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The disagreement stems from the adverse parties’ concerns that the 
Sheyenne River outlet will introduce foreign biota and other environ-
mentally harmful water into the river, which will in turn infect the waters of 
Lake Winnipeg and the Nelson River system, both part of the Hudson Bay 
watershed leading to the Atlantic Ocean.54  The salty waters of Devils Lake 
have high concentrations of nitrogen, sulfates, phosphates, and minerals 
“that could cause severe digestive distress if consumed and could be lethal 
to aquatic life.”55  Therefore, the water quality in Devils Lake is arguably 
much lower than the water quality in the Red River and Lake Winnipeg, 
and the parties against the outlet maintain that the concentrations of certain 
water quality parameters exceed relevant water quality standards.56  
Furthermore, there is a concern regarding the potential for biota transfer 
from Devils Lake to the rest of the Red River basin, largely because of 
indications that there has been no significant exchange of water between the 
Devils Lake sub-basin and the rest of the Red River basin for nearly 1,800 
years.57 
Many of the concerns that had persisted since the planned construction 
of the Pelican Lake outlet by the Army Corps continued to be debated until 
the August 2005 agreement between Manitoba and North Dakota.58  The 
parties opposing the outlet argued that the addition of Devils Lake water 
into the Red River system posed a potential threat to commercial and sport 
fisheries in the waters connected to the Hudson Bay basin.59  Furthermore, 
Manitoba estimates “[t]he total direct and indirect annual value of the Lake 
Winnipeg and Red River commercial and sport fishery to the Manitoba 
economy [to be] nearly [$50 million (Canadian)].”60 
Concerns over water degradation are very real, and yet the solutions to 
those concerns must be weighed against the right of North Dakota to protect 
its citizens.61  Conversely, the struggle over how to properly balance North 
 
has proposed.”  Id. ¶ 2.  But see Gov. John Hoeven, North Dakota Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
2005, at A24.  In response, North Dakota Governor John Hoeven summarized the position of 
North Dakota on the issue: “Canada is opposing our efforts to bring relief to our people.”  Id. ¶ 4.  
“North Dakota will not jeopardize its unblemished record of environmental responsibility for the 
Devils Lake outlet or any other project.”  Id. 
54. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 818. 
55. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. 
56. GOV’T OF MANITOBA, MANITOBA’S CONCERNS: GARRISON–DAKOTA WATER 
RESOURCES ACT AND DEVILS LAKE OUTLET 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/ 
waterstewardship/transboundary/positions/man-position/backgr.html. 
57. Id. 
58. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2. 
59. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 818. 
60. Id. (citing Information Bulletin, Gov’t Of Manitoba and North Dakota Views, 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/environ/pagesnews/devlake/ib000403.html) (first alteration in original). 
61. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24. 
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Dakota’s use of its police powers to help its own citizens is weighed heavily 
against the interest of such parties as Manitoba to protect their waters from 
pollution.62 
III. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL AND 
STATE-LEVEL REGULATION 
International and inter-state transboundary disputes over environmental 
pollution, such as the one involving Devils Lake, arise fairly often, and their 
resolution is almost always complicated.63  Perhaps the leading factor 
contributing to the overall complexity is the question of jurisdictional 
authority: Who has authority to make decisions, the federal government or 
the individual states?64  Additionally, to whom should these decisions be 
appealed?65  Although a system of cooperative federalism exists in the 
United States to confront this issue, the answers to these questions are not 
entirely clear. 66 
A. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: FEDERAL-LEVEL REGULATION 
Water pollution can, and often does, cross international political 
boundaries.67  As a result, transboundary water disputes are not new to the 
judicial systems of the United States and Canada.68  Though a variety of 
different arguments are often made on both sides, the questions that con-
sistently arise in most cases are the following: how much pollution is 
enough; who regulates it; and how?69  In the oft-cited Trail Smelter deci-
sions of the 1930s, the federal government tried to answer some of these 
questions.70  The essential holding of the Trail Smelter decisions is that in 
 
62. Id. 
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 
932 (1997) (explaining that when pollution which originates in one state makes its way to the 
bordering state, both jurisdictions have trouble regulating it effectively). 
64. Id. at 932-33 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 932.  Merrill explains the inherent problems with a cooperative federalism system: 
“Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in 
environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for 
that trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.”  Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See generally Neil S. Kagan, Great Lakes Commentary: Building On The Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement: The Next 25 Years, 1998 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 37, 
40-45 (1998) (discussing the history between the United States and Canada in regards to the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, its enforcement, and the problems and solutions created over 
time). 
69. Merrill, supra note 63, at 932. 
70. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938); see Austen L. Parrish, 
Trail Smelter Deju Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for 
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any transboundary dispute, no country has the right to use its territory or to 
allow its territory to be used in a way that causes serious injury to the 
territory of another.71  The rationale laid forth in these decisions continues 
to serve as the basis for most transboundary dispute resolutions.72 
However, unlike traditional American jurisprudence, where common 
law, statutes, and constitutional provisions provide a relatively clear 
framework for the operation of environmental regulation, international law 
depends largely on negotiations and political relationships to define the 
rights and responsibilities of the states.73  For the most part, international 
law operates with little procedural hierarchy, and many times it does not 
give any court or agency legal authority over another.74  Because of these 
inherent problems, the channels and procedures for proper dispute resolu-
tion are unusually cloudy.75  When dealing with international transboundary 
pollution problems, it is often only to treaty law that one can turn for 
solutions to these difficult questions.76 
In the Devils Lake dispute, the germane international treaty law is the 
Boundary Waters Treaty (hereinafter BWT) of 1909.77  The BWT created 
an agreement between the United States and Great Britain, including the 
sovereign nation of Canada.78  The BWT states that both nations agree to 
work amicably toward the resolution of all international transboundary 
disputes in regards to pollution in all “navigable waters.”79  Additionally, 
the BWT created the International Joint Commission (hereinafter IJC), the 
controlling international administrative body overseeing all transboundary 
water disputes between the United States and Canada.80  The BWT has been 
used to help solve many transboundary water disputes between Canada and 
 
Solutions to Canadian–U.S. Transboundary Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 364, & n.1 
(2005) (explaining that the Trail Smelter Arbitrations between the United States and Canada in the 
1930s required a Canadian company operating the Trail Smelter to cease causing damage to the 
State of Washington). 
71. Parrish, supra note 70, at 364, & n.1. 
72. Id. at 364. 
73. Merrill, supra note 63, at 934. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
78. Id. at Preamble.  In 1909, Great Britain was the sovereign of Canada.  Id. 
79. Id. at Preliminary Article.  “For the purpose of this treaty boundary waters are defined as 
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or the 
portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the 
Dominion of Canada passes.”  Id. 
80. Id. at Article IV. 
      
1006 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:997 
the United States since its inception;81 however, in the Devils Lake conflict, 
the IJC has not, as of the writing of this Note, been asked to review the 
case.82  Without an obvious recourse to treaty law, Manitoba, Minnesota, 
and the other interested parties were forced to turn to federal environmental 
statutes for answers.83 
1. Federal Statutory Regulation 
The federal government of the United States, in the form of the EPA, 
uses statutory provisions to regulate most areas of environmental law.84  In 
the Devils Lake dispute, there are two essential statutes that come into play: 
(1) the Clean Water Act (CWA);85 and (2) the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA).86  Enacted in 1969, NEPA was the first major 
statutory provision created by the federal government that had a significant 
impact on environmental pollution.87  Soon after the passage of NEPA, the 
CWA was passed in 1972.88 
Together, the enactment of NEPA and the CWA ushered in a 
previously unknown era of environmental protection for the collective 
waters of the United States.89  The CWA declares that “[t]he objective of 
this Act is to restore and maintain the . . . biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters [and] [i]n order to achieve this objective it is hereby 
declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act . . . it is the national 
policy that the discharge of . . . pollutants . . . be prohibited.”90  The use of 
such expansive language exemplifies the all-encompassing vision shared by 
both NEPA and the CWA, and, consequently, they bestow upon the federal 
 
81. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 841 (explaining that “[t]he factual record appears to 
bear out the view that the IJC has been successful in acting as an impartial and independent body 
making principled decisions”). 
82. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.  However, pursuant to the August 2005 agreement, the 
IJC will appoint the International Red River Board to implement a shared risk management 
strategy for the greater Red River basin.  Press Release, supra note 10, at 2. 
83. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 840. 
84. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 2 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that “[e]nvironmental law has grown from a sparse set of 
common law precedents and local ordinances to encompass a vast body of national legislation”). 
85. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). 
86. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
87. See generally Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away 
of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 
L. 245, 246 (2000) (applauding Congress’s enactment of NEPA, but expressing skepticism about 
its long-term effectiveness). 
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
89. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569, 784 (discussing both statutes’ 
impact on modern environmental regulation). 
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3). 
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government significant powers of regulation in any water pollution 
dispute.91 
2. International Disputes: State Level Regulation 
Though states are also bound by international treaty law, the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives states the 
right of decisional autonomy and the power to regulate through their own 
state laws.92  Naturally, this dynamic creates a conflict of enforcement.93  
Congress gives the EPA the power to regulate through environmental 
statutes, but individual states often desire their own decision-making 
authority.94  This conflict is, at least in theory, solved by a system of 
cooperative federalism.95  Under such a system, the EPA allows states to 
regulate their pollution problems, with the EPA keeping a watchful eye 
from above.96  However, complications inevitably arise when the impetus 
behind the creation of the law interferes with the law’s enforcement.97  
Because of these reasons, the body of laws governing cross-state pollution 
remains nearly as undeveloped as those laws governing international 
transboundary pollution.98 
B. TRANSBOUNDARY DISPUTES: STATE VERSUS STATE 
Much like the problems involved in international water pollution 
disputes at the inter-state level, satisfactory solutions to transboundary 
pollution are difficult to achieve.99  Historically, common law nuisance and 
trespass actions served as viable dispute resolution tools in inter-state 
 
91. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569, 784.  Common law has clearly stated that 
federal regulation trumps any state regulation concerning pollution concerns.  Id.  This concept 
was first decided in Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 423-26 (1925), 
where the Supreme Court held that federal law trumps state law on any water diversion issue.  
This result stems from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which gives the 
federal government power to enforce an injunction against a state water outlet project, and to hold 
authority over a state’s right of police power.  Id. 
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
93. See Steven M. Siros, Transboundary Pollution in the Great Lakes: Do Individual States 
Have Any Role to Play in Its Prevention?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 287, 288 (1996) (explaining the 
inherent conflict that results from the cooperative federalism system between individual states and 
the federal government). 
94. Id. at 288-91. 
95. Id. 
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000) (providing that “[i]t is the policy of Congress that the 
authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be super-
seded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter”). 
97. Merrill, supra note 63, at 933. 
98. Id. 
99. Siros, supra note 93, at 288. 
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conflicts.100  However, court decisions based on common law have been 
severely restricted since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,101 where the Court held that individual 
states are bound by the CWA and may not use their own nuisance laws to 
sue a polluting neighbor state.102  As a consequence, Ouellette closed the 
door on downstream states bringing claims based on their own nuisance 
laws because doing so would violate Congress’s intent behind the enact-
ment of the CWA.103  However, in Ouellette, the Court held that down-
stream states injured by the actions of the polluting upstream states may 
still bring a nuisance claim under the upstream state’s nuisance laws.104  
Despite this concession, after the ruling in Ouellette, many litigants appear 
to feel bound by EPA-administered environmental statutes, and, therefore, 
most petitioners do not bring common law or statutory nuisance claims 
when federally mandated environmental statutes are involved.105  Despite 
this tendency, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ouellette did 
leave room for a downstream state to bring a nuisance claim as a remedy to 
water pollution injuries; however, whether or not litigants see nuisance law 
as a viable regulatory tool appears questionable.106 
In any case, and perhaps inconsistent with the concept of state sover-
eignty, most water pollution abatement actions are restricted by the federal 
CWA, and downstream states are precluded from controlling pollutants 
originating within the upstream point-source state unless the downstream 
state chooses to bring a nuisance action under the upstream state’s nuisance 
law.107  After the Ouellette decision, the trend has been to move away from 
nuisance remedies, and when downstream states are harmed by 
 
100. Id. at 289. 
101. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
102. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491. 
103. Id. at 508. 
104. Id. at 510. 
105. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-95 (discussing the Ouellette decision and its effect on 
nuisance law claims); see also Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 55, at 1-4 (deciding not to bring a nuisance law 
cause of action). 
106. Siros, supra note 93, at 209. 
107. Id. at 290.  Siros explains the importance of Ouellette for inter-state transboundary 
disputes: 
[T]he Ouellette Court emphasized the role of affected states in the permitting system 
as being subordinate to that of the source state, with the only available remedy being 
the affected state’s ability to petition the Environmental Protection Agency . . . 
[because the] [a]pplication of an affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also 
would undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit 
system. 
Id. (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496) (final alteration in original). 
      
2006] NOTE 1009 
transboundary pollution, as the State of Minnesota claimed to be in People, 
those states often feel their only option is to look to federal remedies rather 
than direct state-level regulation.108 
IV. THE SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 
In response to the groundswell of popular support for environmental 
protection and conservation, Congress enacted the landmark National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969,109 which requires federal 
agencies to take environmental concerns into account when the agency 
implements any federally funded program that could have a significant 
impact on the environment.110  NEPA corresponds in many ways to the 
Canadian federal statute mandating environmental assessment, the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).111 
The key difference between NEPA and the CWA is that, rather than 
using a traditional regulatory approach in dealing with individual polluters 
such as business and industry, NEPA instead delegates decision-making 
authority to individual federal agencies such as the EPA.112  NEPA requires 
that the EPA, to the “fullest extent possible,” must consider alternatives to 
its actions with the aim of reducing environmental impact.113  In practice, 
NEPA is applied on a case-by-case basis, where federal and cooperating 
state agencies are required to assess the environmental impacts and the 
 
108. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-95 (discussing the Ouellette decision and its effect on 
nuisance law claims); see also Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 1-5 (making no mention of a nuisance law 
claim). 
109. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) [hereinafter NEPA].  
Section 4321, entitled “Congressional Declaration of Purpose,” reads: 
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and 
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Policy. 
Id. 
110. Id. § 4332.  The section is entitled: “Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of 
information; recommendations; international and national coordination of efforts.”  Id. 
111. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 855; Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 
37 (1985). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
113. Id. § 4332(C)(iii). 
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particular benefits of each action in terms of which actions are least likely 
to adversely effect the environment.114 
This assessment process involves considering the general environ-
mental impact of any planned action through an EIS.115  All federal 
agencies are required to conduct an EIS for any major federal action that 
could significantly affect the quality of the environment.116  The EIS must 
include a detailed statement of environmental impact,117 alternatives to the 
proposed action,118 and any irretrievable commitments of resources 
involved.119  Finally, an EIS applies to any federally funded environmental 
project that presents potential pollution concerns.120 
Under any case-by-case approach, the federal government has 
stipulated that NEPA impact assessments are also intended to cover the 
transboundary effects of all federal actions.121  A NEPA assessment is to be 
applied to any proposed federal action which may have transboundary 
pollution effects, because of the “worldwide and long-range character of 
environmental problems.”122  Furthermore, NEPA directs federal agencies 
to assist other countries in preventing any transboundary water pollution.123  
To this end, NEPA requires that federal agencies assess environmental 
impact to the extent that it may be reasonably foreseeable.124 
However, as indicated below, the NEPA-mandated environmental 
impact statement (EIS) requirement has been somewhat undermined by the 
CWA’s delegation of power, under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit system, to individual states.125  The 
NPDES permit program allows individual states to prepare their own 
functional equivalent of a federal EIS if a state project is funded, not by the 
 
114. Id. § 4332. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. § 4332(C). 
118. Id. § 4332(C)(iii). 
119. Id. § 4332(C)(v). 
120. Id. § 4332(C). 
121. Id. § 4332(F).  The statute provides: 
The Federal Government Shall: recognize the worldwide and long-range character of 
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United 
States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to 
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the 
quality of mankind’s world environment. 
Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 849.  All governmental bodies must be aware of the 
potential impacts of federal actions on transboundary watersheds.  Id. at 850. 
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
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federal government, but by purely state dollars.126  Thus, although an EIS is 
still technically required of all federally funded projects, states can 
circumvent the requirement by applying for a CWA permit, and in turn, 
developing their own environmental impact analysis document and 
completely funding a project on their own.127 
B. THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
In 1972, following the precepts of NEPA, Congress enacted a more 
regulatory statute, the Clean Water Act (CWA),128 which prohibits all 
environmentally damaging discharges of pollutants from non-permit ex-
empted point sources129 into the “navigable waters” of the United States.130  
The CWA is the most comprehensive source of federal regulatory authority 
overseeing water pollution.131  Adopting a lofty, and arguably cost-blind 
goal, the opening passages of the CWA dictate that “the discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,” and that the 
enforcing authority is to work towards the “protection and propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and . . . recreation in and on that water.”132  This 
sweeping set of legislation came in response to Congress’s recognition that 
pollution could have severely deleterious effects on the environment, 
diminishing recreational and economic opportunities, while posing clear 
threats to public health.133  Additionally, § 1311134 of the CWA imposes 
 
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (discussing the responsibilities of state agencies, and the 
federal government’s responsibility to oversee that states comply with the statute); see also 
Georgia River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1340-42 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003).  In Georgia River Network, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was not required to issue an EIS prior to 
issuing a CWA § 1342 permit to a county water authority for the creation of a reservoir in the 
State of Georgia.  Id. 
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).  The permit program provides that “the Administrator may, 
after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant . . . 
notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet . . . all 
applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title.”  Id. 
128. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).  The CWA was passed in 1972 as the 
“Federal Water Pollution Control Act,” and renamed the Clean Water Act in 1977.  Id. 
129. See id. § 1362(14) (defining the term “point source”).  “The term ‘point source’ means 
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, 
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal 
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”  Id. 
130. See id. § 1362(7) (defining the term “navigable waters”).  “The term ‘navigable waters’ 
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (endorsing a functional approach to the 
definition of “navigable waters”). 
131. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 569. 
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
133. Id. § 1251(b). 
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effluent limitations on dischargers by prohibiting “the ‘discharge of a[ny] 
pollutant’”135 into navigable waters, as well as requiring statewide planning 
for control of pollution through the § 1342 permit program.136 
C. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER THE CWA 
Under the collaborative CWA system, each state choosing to 
implement the CWA program must meet the minimum federal requirements 
under § 1342(b), and must assume all responsibility for issuance of permits 
to all point source dischargers.137  Section 1342 prohibits the discharge of 
any pollutant from a point source to surface waters, except when the 
discharge is covered with an NPDES permit.138  The rationale behind the 
decision to allow states to develop their own environmental impact analyses 
is that individual states may be in a better position to recognize and develop 
the functional equivalent of an NEPA-mandated EIS statement.139  To 
obtain a CWA-mandated NPDES permit, the delegated state agency must 
conduct scientific studies, collect public input, and submit a report of the 
agency approved plan.140  All of these requirements are similar in scope to a 
 
134. Id. § 1311. 
135. See id. § 1362(12) (defining the term “discharge of a pollutant”).  The statute provides: 
The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term “discharge of pollutants” each means 
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any 
addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any 
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft. 
Id. 
136. Id. § 1342. 
137. Id. § 1342(b). 
138. Id. § 1342.  Congress, in § 1251(b) of the CWA, explained the reasoning behind its 
decision to require a NPDES permit for individual states: 
Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of primary responsibilities and 
rights of States: It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the 
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in 
the exercise of his authority under this chapter.  It is the policy of Congress that the 
States manage the construction grant program under this chapter and implement the 
permit programs under sections 1342 and 1344 of this title.  It is further the policy of 
the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and 
elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to 
State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, 
reduction, and elimination of pollution. 
Id. 
139. Id. § 1342.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (providing that “the Governor of each State 
desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its 
jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it 
proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact.”).   
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). 
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NEPA-mandated EIS.141  Thus, to comply with the CWA agenda and goals 
for the Devils Lake outlet, the North Dakota Department of Health was 
required to take into account a complicated measurement of environmental 
clean-up goals, while simultaneously weighing the economic impact and 
the health of the state’s citizens.142 
In practice, all water redirection decisions, such as the creation of the 
Devils Lake outlet, where the redirection is not an inter-basin transfer, are 
regulated by using the NPDES system with oversight control maintained by 
the EPA.143  Section 61-28-04 of the North Dakota Century Code144 is the 
mandatory statute required for state implementation of the section 1342 
permit program to comply with the CWA.145  The statute designates the 
Health Department as the water pollution control agency, and gives the 
Department broad power to make rules governing the issuance, denial, 
modification, and revocation of permits, and to hold hearings necessary for 
the proper administration of the permit process.146  With the powers granted 
to the North Dakota Water Commission, via the Department of Health, thus 
enumerated, all that remained to be decided in People was whether the 
Department complied with those requirements.147 
In People, Manitoba and Minnesota contended that North Dakota did 
not comply with both section 61-28-04148 and section 61-28-12 of the North 
Dakota Administrative Code149 because it failed to take into account many 
of the environmental concerns, including phosphorous, anti-degradation, 
and the risk of biota transfer.150  It was the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
task in People to consider if this argument held any water.151 
 
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (explaining the necessity and requirements of an “environmental 
assessment” or an “environmental impact statement” under NEPA). 
142. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (discussing the NPDES permit requirements).  But see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332 (discussing the EIS requirements). 
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-04 (2005). 
145. Id. § 61-28-04(12).  “The department is hereby designated as the state water pollution 
control agency for all purposes of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, . . . and is hereby 
authorized to take all action necessary or appropriate to secure to this state the benefits of that act 
and similar federal acts.”  Id. 
146. Id. 
147. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 1, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 323. 
148. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 52, at 6-9. 
149. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-16-01-12 (2005).  The statute explains which discharges will 
violate the EPA permit system.  Id.  Manitoba and Minnesota argued that the potential for foreign 
biota transfer violated the code.  Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 7. 
150. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 32-33, 697 N.W.2d at 331. 
151. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323. 
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D. THE CWA AS APPLIED TO ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: THE 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
In 2002, pursuant to its authority granted by the EPA, the North Dakota 
Water Commission applied for and was granted a North Dakota Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NDPDES) permit from the North Dakota 
Department of Health.152  The Health Department conducted an initial 
environmental review of the project and issued a public notice of its intent 
to issue a permit for the state funded outlet.153 
As required under North Dakota Administrative Code section 33-16-
01-01(2),154 the Health Department held two public hearings and received 
comments in May 2003 which were then compiled and considered by the 
North Dakota Chief of the Environmental Health, L. David Glatt.155  The 
Health Department replied to all of the comments it received at the public 
meetings, as well as those received in writing.156  In July 2003, Glatt 
recommended issuing a permit to the Water Commission for the Sheyenne 
River outlet.157  The original plan was for the outlet to begin operation in 
the summer of 2005, and it would continue as implemented until June of 
2008 when a review of the entire system would be required.158  The Health 
Department’s issuance of the permit also required “biological assessments 
of the ecological condition of the Sheyenne River at four different points, 
and an intake screen to prevent the transfer of adult fish species to the 
Sheyenne River.”159  Furthermore, the permit would limit the operation of 
the outlet to the warmer time period between May through November, and 
it would prohibit any discharge of water if the elevation of Devils Lake 
dipped below 1445 feet.160 
The government of Manitoba, the State of Minnesota, and the environ-
mental interest groups who opposed the approved permit filed petitions for 
 
152. Id. ¶ 5. 
153. Id. at 323-24. 
154. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-16-01-01(2) (2005).  The North Dakota Supreme Court in 
People stated that the code “require[s] notice and public participation for tentative determinations 
and draft permits, a period for public comment, a requirement for responses to comments, the 
preparation of fact sheets for applications, notice to appropriate government agencies, and public 
hearings for applications involving significant public interest.”  People to Save the Sheyenne 
River, ¶ 11, 697 N.W.2d at 325. 
155. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 5, 697 N.W.2d at 323-24 
156. Id. at 324. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. ¶ 6, 697 N.W.2d at 324. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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reconsideration under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-40.161  
The North Dakota Health Department then reopened the administrative 
record for further comments.162  The Health Department responded to the 
newly received comments, and, subsequently, decided the permit would 
still be issued as originally planned.163 
The Health Department’s decision to issue the permit was ultimately 
upheld by the North Dakota Supreme Court in People.164  The court found 
that under the highly deferential “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” 
standard of review,165 the Health Department’s findings regarding the 
permit requirements were sufficient to justify the creation of the Sheyenne 
River outlet.166  This standard of review established a low burden of proof 
for North Dakota and paid deference to Chief Glatt’s findings.167 
In reaching its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained 
that the separation of powers doctrine of the North Dakota Constitution 
gave it very little room to interpret the Health Department’s decision under 
the circumstances of the case.168  The court reasoned that the Health 
Department’s decision-making process did not constitute an adjudicative 
proceeding,169 and, thus, the less deferential “preponderance of evidence” 
 
161. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 7, 697 N.W.2d at 324. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. ¶ 38, 697 N.W.2d at 333. 
165. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323.  The court explained the definition of the standard: 
A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable if it is not the product of a rational 
mental process by which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together for 
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable interpretation.  We consider the 
issues raised in Manitoba’s appeal in light of that highly deferential standard of 
review. 
Id. ¶ 24, 697 N.W.2d at 329 (citing Little v. Traynor, 565 N.W.2d 766, 773 (N.D. 1997)). 
166. Id. ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 323.  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude 
the Health Department’s issuance of the permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable 
under the statutory scheme for the issuance of this permit.”  Id. 
167. Id. ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 326. 
168. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1.  The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained the basic 
premise of the separation of powers doctrine in North Dakota: 
Although the Constitution does not contain a general distributing clause expressly 
providing for division of governmental powers among the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches, creation of those branches operates as an apportionment of the 
different classes of power; as all branches derive their authority from the same 
Constitution, there is an implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the 
functions of the others. 
People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 326 (citing City of Carrington v. Foster 
County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (N.D. 1969)). 
169. Id.  The North Dakota Supreme court explained that “[a]n agency may dispose of any 
adjudicative proceeding by informal disposition, unless otherwise prohibited by statute or rule.”  
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-22). 
      
1016 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:997 
standard of review under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-46170 
did not apply to the case, despite arguments to this effect from Manitoba, 
the Minnesota Attorney General, and the environmental interest groups.171  
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the deferential 
arbitrary and capricious standard was more applicable to environmental law 
questions like the one at hand, because “the subject matter is complex or 
technical and involves agency expertise.”172 
The decision to pay deference to the Health Department’s findings left 
little room for the North Dakota Supreme Court to consider the evidence, 
and to overrule the decisions made by the district court and the Department 
of Health.173  With such a low standard of review, it may be argued that 
Manitoba’s and Minnesota’s arguments essentially fell on deaf ears.174  
Though the proper standard of review was applied, the question to be asked 
is, at what cost?  The decision in People deferred not only to the separation 
of powers doctrine and to the findings of an administrative agency, in the 
form of the North Dakota Department of Health, but also to the pressure 
applied by North Dakota Governor John Hoeven.175  However, such an 
interpretation left little recourse for Manitoba, Minnesota, and the 
environmental interest groups.176  Their last hope seemed to be either a 
highly unlikely federal review by the EPA, or an improbable IJC review 
under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.177 
 
 
170. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (explaining that the “preponderance of 
evidence” standard applies to all findings made by an administrative hearing officer in an 
adjudicative proceeding); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-23.  Section 23-01-23 provides that: 
A permit hearing conducted for purposes of receiving public comment or an 
investigatory hearing conducted under chapters 23-20.1, 23-20.3, 23-25, 23-29, 61-28, 
and 61-28.1 is not an adjudicative proceeding under chapter 28-32 and is not subject 
to the requirements of chapter 54-57 [which requires a preponderance of evidence 
standard]. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
171. Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 52, at 6. 
172. People to Save the Sheyenne River, ¶ 24, 697 N.W.2d at 328. 
173. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A. 
174. Id. 
175. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24. 
176. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A. 
177. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE HOPE OF 
TREATY LAW? 
There is no uniform statutory environmental regulation like NEPA or 
the CWA for the resolution of purely international water disputes.178  
Because of this, injured parties in international transboundary disputes must 
often turn to international treaty law, and more specifically, the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909.179  Unlike statutory environmental law, “[i]nter-
national treaties or conventions are akin to contracts in that they derive their 
legal force from the consent of the parties.”180  Though the international 
portion of the Devils Lake dispute concerns only Canada and the United 
States, the regulation of international waterways is a source of perpetual 
disagreement among nations throughout the world.181  These disputes have 
almost universally sprung from the lack of recognized processes and 
procedures for the creation of a uniform set of laws governing international 
waterways.182  Though international treaty law exists, its actual practical 
usefulness in solving disputes is often limited at best.183 
A. THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY OF 1909 
The Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT) is one of the oldest and most 
significant treaties in existence between Canada and the United States.184  
In light of the changing conditions of the American economy at the turn of 
the century due to the Industrial Revolution, the United States and Canada 
were both concerned with the degradation of water quality caused by 
increasing amounts of industrial pollution.185  Naturally, much of the indus-
try was located at or around large bodies of water such as the Great 
Lakes.186  To rectify some of the problems caused by water pollution across 
international borders, treaties like the BWT were created.187 
 
178. Kagan, supra note 68, at 40-45. 
179. Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Preamble. 
180. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 1036. 
181. See Michael A. Hyman, Under The Dunabe Canopy: The Future of International 
Waterway Law, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (1998) (discussing the 
difficulties that countries all over the world have in developing useful laws to regulate inter-
national water conflicts). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Daniel K. DeWitt, Note, Great Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 302 (1993). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 302-04; see also Great Lakes Treaty, Sept. 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2836 (discussing 
the pollution problems arising out of the Great Lakes region, and providing clean-up goals for 
those problems). 
187. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 820. 
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The Preamble to the Treaty states that it was created to “prevent 
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions 
which are now pending between the United States and the Dominion of 
Canada.”188  However, in spite of the expansive language, the Treaty’s 
actual power to effectively regulate water pollution problems has repeatedly 
been questioned.189  Additionally, questions relating to the relationship 
between the injury one country might incur in response to another country’s 
duty to aid its own citizens remain unclear.190 
One of the major problems of the BWT has to do with its lack of direct 
enforceability.191  One attempt to directly enforce the BWT, as documented 
in Soucheray v. Army Corps of Engineers,192 involved a dispute similar to 
that of Devils Lake, where bays and tributaries of Lake Superior 
overflowed due to the United States Army Corps destruction of a dam, 
which in turn led to the destruction of private property.193  The federal 
district court in Soucheray held that state and federal governments cannot 
sue under the BWT because treaty law cannot violate an American citizen’s 
constitutional rights.194  The effect of Soucheray was to mandate that all 
grievances under the BWT are to be exclusively handled by the IJC.195  
Thus, at least on a superficial level, the IJC is a powerful body when 
considered in terms of its regulatory power over certain transboundary 
disputes between Canada and the United States.196 
 
188. Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Preamble. 
189. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 322.  Dewitt takes the position that the Treaty is outdated, 
largely ineffectual, and lacks any real legitimacy.  Id. at 324. 
190. Id. 
191. Id.  DeWitt bemoans the power of the Treaty, stating, “[t]he present Treaty makes clear 
that the Treaty itself and the IJC exist solely for the pleasure of the two governments and not for 
the people.”  Id. at 323. 
192. 483 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Wisc. 1979). 
193. Soucheray, 483 F. Supp. at 353. 
194. Id. at 357.  The federal district court did note an exception that might occur under the 
BWT when plaintiffs claim there has been a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment: “If the Treaty of 1909 did in some way effect a taking of plaintiffs’ property, they 
would have a much stronger case for the necessity of finding a way to grant them relief.  
However, no taking has occurred here.”  Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 825-27. 
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 
Article IV of the BWT created the IJC to oversee all international 
conflicts involving transboundary water disputes.197  In theory, this does 
much in the way of solving conflicts similar to that of Devils Lake.198  The 
IJC is a bi-national body comprised of six commissioners, three appointed 
by the United States and three by Canada.199  The IJC commissioners 
describe the function of the IJC as “pursuing the common good of both 
countries as an independent and objective adviser to the two govern-
ments.”200  Whether or not the IJC has adequately proven its ability to solve 
conflicts remains in question.201  There is, however, support for the 
commission as a useful scientific body, just not as a decision making one.202 
The BWT endorses two means by which the countries can address 
disputes with each other: (1) submission to arbitration by the IJC; or (2) a 
reference for the opinion of the IJC.203  A binding ruling can be obtained by 
arbitration for either party, but the submission to arbitration may only be 
made upon the consent of both the United States and Canada.204 
Manitoba has argued for an IJC overview of the entire Devils Lake 
project.205  However, North Dakota and the federal government have not 
given their full consent for this type of review.206  Manitoba has argued that 
 
197. Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article VII. 
198. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 825-27. 
199. Id. 
200. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, HANDBOOK ON ORIGIN, MANDATE, FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE, 
PROCEDURES, POLICIES, PRACTICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2000).  Article VIII of the BWT 
explains that the IJC is to oversee the precedence of uses: 
The following order of precedence shall be observed among the various uses 
enumerated hereinafter for these waters, and no use shall be permitted which tends 
materially to conflict with or restrain any other use which is given preference over it in 
this order of precedence: 
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes; 
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purpose of 
navigation; 
(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes. 
Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article VIII. 
201. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 308, 313. 
202. Id. at 310. 
203. Id. at 308.  DeWitt explains that much of the IJC’s power comes from Article X of the 
BWT: “If the two countries both give their consent, issues can be handed to the IJC for binding 
arbitral determination.  This time, if a tie results, reports are sent to the two governments and then 
an umpire is chosen.  The umpire has the power to render a final decision.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
204. Id. 
205. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. 
206. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24. 
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the IJC should be allowed to arbitrate under the premise that the Red River 
clearly qualifies as a navigable water flowing across the international 
boundary, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the BWT.207  Under this 
rationale, the United States is bound by the BWT to not allow any pollution 
to injure the health or property in Manitoba.208  The problem then becomes 
determining how to accommodate international concerns associated with 
projects in the context of larger political and legal processes.209  Up until 
the August 2005 agreement,210 neither North Dakota nor Manitoba 
appeared to put much faith into the negotiation process.211  Instead, both 
parties seemed to see their roles as limiting the scope of the negotiations so 
as not to allow them to have too great an effect on state and provincial 
interests.212 
V. STATE VERSUS STATE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Transboundary disputes on a purely inter-state level pose altogether 
different problems and solutions in comparison to an international 
dispute.213  International treaties like the BWT obviously have no effect on 
the dispute between North Dakota and Minnesota, at least on a purely state 
level.214  However, much like an international dispute, North Dakota and 
Minnesota are still confined to federal environmental law as mandated by 
the EPA, and more specifically, the CWA permit system that exists between 
the EPA and the individual states.215  Generally, the federal government, in 
the form of the EPA, has the final authority over all environmental law 
questions.216  This is because states cannot pass environmental regulations 
 
207. McKenna, supra note 53, at A27. 
208. Id.; see also Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, supra note 77, 36 Stat. 2448 at Article II 
(explaining the rights and remedies held by both countries). 
209. Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24. 
210. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2. 
211. See McKenna, supra note 53, at A27 (discussing Manitoba’s view concerning the 
Devils Lake dispute).  But see Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing North Dakota’s view 
concerning the Devils Lake dispute).  The respective government officials of both North Dakota 
and Manitoba recognize that there is a substantial problem, and that North Dakota needs to do 
something to help its citizens.  McKenna, supra note 53, at A27.  However, both sides have 
historically disagreed on the solution to that problem.  Id. 
212. See Rebuffoni, supra note 8, at 22A (explaining that the Devils Lake agreement came at 
the end of fourteen years of conflict, and only two months after the final decision in People). 
213. Siros, supra note 93, at 288. 
214. Id. at 303. 
215. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (explaining the NPDES permit program as it applies to 
individual states). 
216. Id. § 1342(b). 
      
2006] NOTE 1021 
that are binding over the actions of other states or nations.217  Thus, states 
harmed by transboundary pollution from other states might choose to look 
to other remedies other than direct CWA regulation.218  Nuisance and 
trespass actions were two formerly relied upon solutions, but, as we have 
seen above, common law tort actions have been restricted by recent court 
decisions.219 
A. HISTORICAL COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
Prior to the landmark environmental legislation passed in the 1970s, 
common law, and more specifically nuisance and trespass torts, was the 
primary resource for transboundary dispute resolution in the United States 
legal system.220  Nuisance221 and trespass law222 have a long history, 
stemming from a body of law whose definition could essentially be reduced 
to invasions of interests in the use and enjoyment of land.223  Early nuisance 
law held actors strictly liable when their actions interfered with property 
rights held by others,224 which was a precursor to the strict liability man-
dated by the CWA today.225 
In a state-level dispute, public rather than private nuisance law most 
often comes into play.226  An interesting example of an early common law 
 
217. See Siros, supra note 93, at 288 (stating that “[t]his is a result of: (1) state sovereignty; 
and (2) federal preemption of state environmental laws”). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 288-89. 
220. Id. at 288-92. 
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NUISANCE § 40 (1965) (explaining the 
historical and common law evolution of the tort doctrine of nuisance as it relates to trespass). 
222. See id. § 159 (imposing liability for “Intrusions Upon, Beneath, and Above Surface of 
Earth”). 
223. Id. § 40. 
224. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73. 
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). 
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (defining “Public Nuisance”). 
The Restatement provides: 
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public. 
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public 
right is unreasonable include the following: 
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public 
convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or 
administrative regulation, or 
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a 
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to 
know, has a significant effect upon the public right. 
Id. 
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public nuisance action is the 1923 case North Dakota v. Minnesota,227 
where the United States Supreme Court used trespass law as its rationale for 
determining that Minnesota did not pollute North Dakota’s waters.228  North 
Dakota sought to stop Minnesota from continuing to use a system of drain-
age ditches constructed by Minnesota and to receive monetary compen-
sation for damages to North Dakota farms, public roads, and bridges caused 
by the overflow of a river allegedly due to the construction and operation of 
the ditches.229  The Supreme Court held that Minnesota was not responsible 
for any overflow or damage to North Dakota because, although damage did 
occur, Minnesota’s first obligation was to its own citizens.230  At this point 
in the history of American jurisprudence, the general rationale was to allow 
individual states to help their own citizens, even at the expense of neigh-
boring states.231  It was under this rationale that the Supreme Court found 
that Minnesota was not liable for any flooding damage to North Dakota.232 
This early decision employing common law nuisance and trespass torts 
is a telling example of the Supreme Court’s early rationale involving state-
level transboundary disputes.233  Much like the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in People,234 the United States Supreme Court in North Dakota v. 
Minnesota paid deference to the opinions and decisions of experts in the 
field.235 
 
227. 263 U.S. 365 (1923). 
228. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388. 
229. Id. at 371-72. 
230. Id. at 388. 
231. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73. 
232. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388. 
233. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 73 (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of public 
nuisance was used most frequently in the early [English] common law to prosecute those who 
obstructed public highways or encroached on the royal domain”). 
234. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 38, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 333.  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” 
standard of review paid deference to the North Dakota Department of Health and Water 
Commission for decisions that require complicated scientific and technical knowledge.  Id. ¶ 24, 
697 N.W.2d at 329; see also North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388.  Chief Justice Taft explained the 
United States Supreme Court’s reasoning: 
The conclusion we have come to on the main issue of fact that Minnesota is not 
responsible for the floods of which complaint is made, makes it unnecessary for us to 
consider this evidence as to a practical remedy for them, and requires us to leave the 
opinions and suggestions of the expert engineers for the consideration of the two 
States in a possible effort by either or both to remedy existing conditions in this basin. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
235. North Dakota, 263 U.S. at 388. 
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B. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS: NUISANCE ACTIONS IN LIGHT 
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
When the federal government enacted the CWA, common law tort 
actions lost a great deal of their former significance in remedying state 
versus state disputes.236  In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the United 
States Supreme Court effectively abolished the traditional state common 
law nuisance or trespass actions seen in North Dakota v. Minnesota, in 
favor of water pollution being regulated by the CWA.237 
In Ouellette, the issue before the Court was whether the CWA 
preempted a state’s use of its own common law definitions of nuisance to 
impose liability on another state’s point source.238  The State of New York 
had granted a permit to the International Paper Company to discharge 
pollutants into a waterway that the crossed the boundary between New 
York and Vermont.239  The issuance of the permit would have resulted in 
pollution being released into the waterway, subsequently affecting the 
quality of the water entering Vermont.240  As a result, interested parties in 
Vermont attempted to utilize Vermont’s nuisance common law to impose 
liability on the New York point source.241 
The Supreme Court in Ouellette examined whether Vermont’s common 
law action had any role in light of the regulatory scheme of the CWA.242  
The Court noted that, as was decided in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,243 the 
CWA had established a sophisticated system of water pollution regulation 
to be used in transboundary water disputes.244  Keeping this in mind, the 
Ouellette Court reasoned that the affected state’s position in the permit 
 
236. Siros, supra note 93, at 291-92. 
237. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484-86 (1987); see City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 304-05 (1981) (serving as the precursor decision for Ouellette); see also 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 91 (1992).  In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, Oklahoma challenged 
the permit before the EPA on grounds that the discharge violated Oklahoma’s water quality 
standards.  503 U.S. at 91.  The Court held that an affected state’s only recourse was to apply to 
the EPA administrator, who then had the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concluded that 
the discharges would have an undue impact on interstate waters, pursuant to the Clean Water Act.  
Id. at 111-14.  The Supreme Court stated that the CWA made it clear that affected states occupy a 
subordinate position to source states in the federal regulatory program.  Id. 
238. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483. 
239. Id. at 483-84. 
240. Id. at 484. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 484-85. 
243. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
244. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 
(1981)).  The Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee concluded that with the passage of the CWA, 
Congress intended the EPA to handle all pollution regulation, leaving no room for federal 
common law nuisance actions.  City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 310. 
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system was subordinate to that of the state who applied for a permit.245  In 
its explanation, the Supreme Court concluded that an “application of an 
affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also would undermine the 
important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.”246  
Thus, Vermont’s common law could not be used to impose liability on a 
New York point source.247 
Under the holding of Ouellette, it is clear that Minnesota can no more 
control North Dakota’s permitting program through its own nuisance laws 
than North Dakota could pass a law directly taxing Minnesota’s 
residents.248  Within a state’s borders, each state determines its own rules of 
law and policies of social and industrial regulation.249  Thus, many injured 
parties appear to believe that nuisance law has been rendered obsolete by 
the § 1342 NPDES permit program, and that any state looking for recourse 
in water pollution disputes would be wise to look only to federal statutory 
law.250  However, the ruling in Ouellette left open the door for a petitioner 
to bring a nuisance complaint under the law of the state which had applied 
for, and was granted, a NPDES permit.251  Thus, in the Devils Lake sce-
nario, Minnesota and Manitoba still had the option of bringing a nuisance 
claim under North Dakota law.252  The question becomes: Why didn’t they?  
Although the answer to this question is not entirely clear, perhaps it can be 
explained by the general reluctance of parties to bringing nuisance claims 
after the Ouellette decision.253  This may explain why a nuisance suit was 
not brought by any of the suing parties in People.254 
Despite the apparent reluctance to utilize another states’ nuisance law, 
there are scholars who argue in favor of using nuisance laws as a viable 
remedy to transboundary water pollution.255  Indeed, the United States 
 
245. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491. 
246. Id. at 496. 
247. Id. at 497. 
248. Siros, supra note 93, at 288. 
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (granting states the right to govern their own 
citizens). 
250. Id. 
251. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 481-85. 
252. Id. 
253. See Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 4-10 (failing to argue for a nuisance law remedy). 
254. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 7, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 324. 
255. Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water Act as a Means 
of Enhancing Environmental Protection, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 196-98 (1996) (arguing 
that “[c]urrent societal interest in the property rights movement, state sovereignty, accountability, 
and regulatory efficiency have been used to undermine environmental protection at the federal 
level.  However, incorporating these same values into a revised approach to preemption analysis 
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Supreme Court in Ouellette specifically held that nuisance law may still be 
used in cases of environmental pollution.256  In theory, North Dakota’s 
nuisance law257 provides the same potential remedy for pollution com-
plaints as does Minnesota’s nuisance law.258  Although the appellants in 
People did not choose to bring a nuisance claim against North Dakota, their 
decision not to do so does not preclude other interested parties from 
choosing to act differently.259  Therefore, although nuisance law after 
Ouellette appears to be disfavored, nuisance law’s mandate of strict 
liability, and its potential for injunctive relief, make it a viable and perhaps 
powerful tool for transboundary water pollution disputes.260 
VI. THE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
The August 2005 agreement between Manitoba and North Dakota 
seems to indicate an end to the Devils Lake dispute.261  Barring an improb-
able review by the IJC, Manitoba and Minnesota have little choice but to 
accept the decision handed down in People.262  For this reason, Manitoba 
has tried to make the best of the situation by agreeing with North Dakota to 
cooperate in the design and construction of the Sheyenne River outlet.263 
 
could enhance environmental protection . . .”); see also Kathleen Roth, Note, A Landowner’s 
Remedy Laid to Waste: State Preemption of Private Nuisance Claims Against Regulated Pollution 
Sources, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 423 (1996) (arguing that “[t]o apply the 
permit as an across-the-board preclusion of private nuisance remedies unfairly imposes the burden 
of industry discharges on the parties harmed by this pollution and invites abuse from unscrupulous 
sources”). 
256. Lininger, supra note 255, at 193; Roth, supra note 255, at 423. 
257. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01 (2005) (defining nuisance). 
A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act or omitting to perform a duty, which 
act or omission: 
1.  Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others; 
2.  Offends decency; 
3. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or renders dan-
gerous for passage, any lake, navigable river, bay, stream, canal, basin, public 
park, square, street, or highway; or 
4.  In any way renders other persons insecure in life or in the use of property. 
Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-07 (2005) (explaining that the potential remedies for 
public nuisance complaints are: “1. Indictment; 2. Filing an information; 3. Bringing a criminal 
action before a district court judge; 4. A civil action; or 5. Abatement”). 
258. See Roth, supra note 255, at 420-23 (arguing that nuisance law is still a viable remedy 
for injured parties). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2. 
262. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A. 
263. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2. 
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The agreement is not completely without merit for Manitoba, for it 
contains a certain number of concessions made by North Dakota.264  For 
example, the outlet will use a more sophisticated filtration system by 
incorporating a rock and gravel filter to clock the release of “macroscopic 
aquatic nuisance species.”265  Furthermore, the IJC has created the 
International Red River Board to develop and implement a shared-risk 
management strategy for the greater Red River Basin, with the goal of 
creating an “early detection and monitoring system for water quality and 
aquatic nuisance species throughout the Basin.”266  Additionally, Manitoba 
will be allowed to construct a dike on the Red River near the international 
border at Pembina, North Dakota.267  The dike will “provide for water 
monitoring downstream to help prevent invasive species, nitrogen and 
phosphorus from crossing the border.”268  Finally, North Dakota and 
Manitoba have agreed to: 
Share and review prior scientific work studying the potential for 
“aquatic nuisance species,” such as invasive fish or plants, and 
parasites; [j]ointly conduct a rapid bio-assessment of the Lake by 
20 biologists from the U.S. and Canada to enhance our collective 
understanding of Lake organisms; [and] [d]evelop shared 
strategies to protect the broader Red River Basin from future risk 
of aquatic nuisance species that might pose a significant risk to the 
Basin.269 
Clearly, the agreement has helped to assuage some of the most embattled 
issues and does result in some tangible benefits for Manitoba.270 
As the agreement demonstrates, cost-benefit and risk-benefit analyses 
have become a standard part of environmental policy decisions.271  In order 
to determine whether a proposed governmental regulation may actually lead 
to the improvement of public welfare, it is often necessary to subject the 
policy to an analysis of the overall benefits of the proposed regulation in 
comparison with any possible injurious effects the initiative could have on 
the environment.272  On one hand, we can weigh the social benefit of the 
 
264. Id. 
265. Id 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Krauss, supra note 9, at 1. 
269. Press Release, supra note 9, at 1. 
270. Id.  But see Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A (discussing the State of Minnesota’s 
lingering concerns and feelings of exasperation at not being included in the negotiation process). 
271. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 29. 
272. Id. 
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policy, and on the other hand, we can examine the environmental cost.273  
Somewhere in the middle lies economic cost.274  Naturally, trade-offs must 
always be made.275 
The ramifications of the Devils Lake dispute have long-term 
consequences for not only the immediate residents of North Dakota, but 
also for other transboundary disputes on a national and global scale.276  In 
the Devils Lake scenario, it is improbable that anyone would argue that the 
federal government and North Dakota do not have an obligation to help the 
citizens of North Dakota to cope with the massive structural and monetary 
damage caused by the flooding.277  However, it may also be argued that it 
was the residents of North Dakota who encroached on the lake and not vice 
versa.278 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INCREASE THE SCOPE AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE 
BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY 
As should be clear from this Note, a certain body of treaty law already 
exists on these points; however, its effectiveness is noticeably lacking.279  
Without more powerful treaty law, the resolution of international water 
disputes becomes enmeshed in a slew of negotiations and arbitrations, often 
without real solutions.280  One answer to this dilemma is to increase the 
authority of the BWT.281  This could be accomplished by requiring that all 
international water disputes be automatically subject to an IJC review.282  
 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 858. 
276. Siros, supra note 93, at 288. 
277. See Krauss, supra note 19 at 17 (discussing the August 2005 agreement). 
278. See FEMA Report, supra note 20 (discussing the need for a federal flood insurance 
program to help home owners relocate their homes away from the flooding lake which has long 
been recognized as having little or no natural drainage basin). 
279. See DeWitt, supra note 184, at 323 (emphasizing the need for changes to the BWT).  
DeWitt calls for two changes to make the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 more effective: 
The first is to rewrite the Treaty in a way that fundamentally changes its nature as a 
tool of the governments to being an “environmental pledge” to the people.  This first 
proposal gives no new specific power to the IJC, but for the reasons set out below, will 
substantially increase the IJC’s influence.  The second proposal is to establish a 
“science judgment board” to settle scientific discrepancies and encourage scientific 
research throughout the basin. 
Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
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Additionally, making the IJC more of a regulatory authority would solve 
many problems because it would eliminate the need for appeals for review, 
via either forced diplomacy or polemical editorials in national newspapers 
like the New York Times.283  Finally, because the BWT was enacted in 
1909, an argument can and has been made that it is outdated.284  Perhaps it 
is time for the respective governments of the United States and Canada to 
discuss potential changes to the Treaty that would enable the governments 
to more ably cope with transboundary disputes in the twenty-first 
century.285 
B. INCREASE THE BURDEN ON THE PERMIT OPERATOR AND/OR 
OVERSIGHT BY THE EPA 
The federal government should not completely ignore international 
transboundary water disputes merely by delegating authority to the states or 
provinces, essentially washing its hands of the matter.286  Under the § 1342 
permit program, the EPA is required to work with the states in implemen-
tation and regulation under the permit.287  This is the goal of a system of 
cooperative federalism.288 
In both international and domestic law, therefore, a general failure to 
develop an effective central strategy for regulating transboundary pollution 
is manifest.289  Case-by-case approaches based on international law or 
American common law have failed to address the problem in a rigorous and 
useful manner.290  As a consequence, no specific legal norms have been 
 
283. See Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute); McKenna, supra note 53, at 
A27 (discussing the dispute).  Crossfire in the media, such as that between the Ambassador of 
Manitoba, McKenna, and North Dakota Governor John Hoeven, is a telling example of the lengths 
to which government officials from competing countries must go to in light of the lack of 
powerful dispute-solving treaty law.  See Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute); 
McKenna, supra note 53, at A27 (discussing the dispute).  Additionally, the publication of 
editorials in the New York Times puts the Devils Lake issue into the spotlight on an international 
level, a ploy which is sure to catch the attention of government officials like United States 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who might be swayed to lobby for an IJC review.  See 
Hoeven, supra note 53, at A24 (discussing the dispute); McKenna, supra note 53, at A27 
(discussing the dispute). 
284. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 323. 
285. Id. 
286. Siros, supra note 93, at 288. 
287. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). 
288. Siros, supra note 93, at 311.  As Siros points out, there is some hope under recent case 
law that the EPA may be taking steps to become more involved in the permit process; however, he 
expresses skepticism: “Unfortunately, this in and of itself, is not enough.  The discretion granted 
the EPA should be restricted, and when an affected state can show a significant interference with a 
water . . . quality standard, the EPA should be required to take action.”  Id. 
289. Id.; see DeWitt, supra note 184, at 302 (discussing the problems of the current 
American system of cooperative federalism). 
290. DeWitt, supra note 184, at 302. 
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created.291  One solution is to include more state and province repre-
sentatives in the international negotiations.292 
C. REQUIRE THAT ALL STATE IMPLEMENTED CWA PERMITS BE 
ISSUED ONLY AFTER AN ADJUDICATIVE HEARING HAS BEEN 
HELD 
Requiring that every NPDES permit, in terms of those permits issued 
by state agencies such as the North Dakota Department of Health in People, 
be issued only after an adjudicative proceeding has been held, would ensure 
that all contested viewpoints are satisfactorily considered.293  Perhaps the 
principal argument in favor of requiring an adjudicative proceeding for all 
issuances of NPDES permits is that the higher “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard of judicial review would necessarily be applied by 
appellate courts when reviewing an agency’s decision to grant a permit.294  
This argument has persuasive merit as explained by the Court in People, 
who found that under the North Dakota Administrative Procedures Act, the 
Act generally defines the issuance of permits to require an adjudicative 
proceeding.295  However, the CWA, as applied to North Dakota through 
North Dakota Century Code section 23-01-23, circumvents the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement, and instead allows states to 
grant permits through informal rulemaking where the “arbitrary, capricious 
or unreasonable” standard of review is to be applied to all agency decisions 
made within their discretion and at the behest of Congress.296 
 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453-60 (1989) (arguing that the delegation doctrine 
of the United States Constitution does not permit the current level of deference that courts give to 
most administrative agency decisions). 
294. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (requiring that appellate courts utilize the 
“preponderance of  the evidence” standard for all adjudicative proceedings held before an 
administrative agency). 
295. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 13, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 325. 
296. Id. ¶ 19, 697 N.W.2d at 327.  The North Dakota Supreme Court explained their decision 
to use the “arbitrary and capricious standard of review,” stating that: 
Section 23-01-23, N.D.C.C., was enacted in 1995 to specifically preclude application 
of the ‘contested case’ procedural requirements of the Administrative Agencies 
Practice Act to environmental permit hearings conducted for the purpose of receiving 
public comment, because the potential cost requirements for contested case procedures 
for those type of permit hearings would be ‘astronomical’. 
Id. (citing Hearing on Senate Bill 2154 before Senate Judiciary Committee, 54th N.D. Legis. Sess. 
(Jan. 11, 1995) (testimony of William J. Delmore, Assistant Attorney General for Environmental 
Section of Health Department)). 
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Therefore, in People, the North Dakota Supreme Court correctly 
applied the “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” standard of review to the 
North Dakota Department of Health’s decision to issue the permit without 
an adjudicative proceeding, and the Court thereby ensured not to offend the 
North Dakota Legislature or North Dakota Governor John Hoeven.297  The 
Department of Health was only required to adhere to informal rulemaking 
procedures as required by section 23-01-23,298 and, therefore, the agency’s 
notice of and conducting of the two public hearings was found to be 
sufficient.299 
However, Manitoba and the public interest groups appealed the suit to 
the North Dakota Supreme Court to be heard on its merits, which, it may be 
argued, was not done.300  This is not to say that courts should take it upon 
themselves to become policy makers; it is only to suggest that perhaps 
Congress was either not clear enough, or too permissive, in delineating 
which specifications need to be met when applying for and implementing 
the CWA permit system.301  However, in the main, the courts are not to 
blame in this matter.302  To be fair, a lobbying effort to change the standard 
of review might make more sense.303  Perhaps the myriad of environmental 
special interest groups like those in People could take up this cause.304 
D. REVISIT THE ORIGINAL RATIONALE FOR NUISANCE LAW 
Pollution that originates in one state and spills over into another is very 
difficult for either jurisdictional authority to regulate effectively.305  The 
affected state may not be able to obtain jurisdiction over actors in the source 
state, or, if it can obtain jurisdiction, the affected state may have difficulties 
 
297. Id.  ¶ 19, 27 697 N.W.2d at 327, 330. 
298. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-23 (2005) (providing that a permit hearing is not an 
adjudicative hearing). 
299. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 20, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 327. 
300. Editorial, supra note 1, at 16A; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2005) (explaining 
that on appeal from an adjudicative proceeding made before an administrative agency, courts are 
to scrutinize the record made before the agency to determine if the agency’s decision was lawful). 
301. See Farina, supra note 293, at 453-60 (arguing that complete deference should not be 
given to an administrative agency when Congress’s intention behind the statute is ambiguous). 
302. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 550-60 (1985) (discussing the benefits of judicial deference to administrative agencies). 
303. Id. 
304. See id. at 574-75 (arguing that legislators, as opposed to the courts, have gained in-
depth knowledge of the reasoning behind the enactment of a statute which renders them more 
qualified to define the particular meaning of their own words). 
305. See Siros, supra note 93, at 288-90 (offering a useful discussion of the problems that 
often arise in transboundary disputes). 
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enforcing its statutes.306  Because of the shift in regulation stemming from 
the permit process in the CWA, states like Minnesota appear to no longer 
see using nuisance law as a viable option for this type of transboundary 
water dispute.307  However, Minnesota and Manitoba still had the option of 
bringing a claim under North Dakota’s nuisance laws.308  The United States 
Supreme Court opinion in Ouellette left open the opportunity for injured 
downstream parties, or in the case at hand, Minnesota and Manitoba, to 
utilize a tort law nuisance action.309  For whatever reason, and despite the 
availability of North Dakota’s nuisance laws, many parties appear not to 
believe that nuisance law is a viable solution to transboundary water 
disputes.310  However, there are scholars who insist that, despite the modern 
use of federal preemption through federal statutes like the CWA, there is 
still potential for a rebirth of nuisance law being a viable remedy for injured 
downstream parties.311  Public nuisance law was used for hundreds of years 
in English common law jurisprudence, and subsequently adopted by 
American courts as a means for regulating water disputes.312  Though the 
CWA essentially mandates strict liability, true liability of polluters becomes 
muddled in a permit system which prevents some, but not all, discharges of 
polluting waste. 313 
 
306. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 481-85 (1987). 
307. See Siros, supra note 93, at 289-92 (explaining the demise of nuisance law as an 
effective regulatory tool).  The amicus brief filed by the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, and the Minnesota Attorney General makes 
no mention of nuisance law.  Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 55, at 4. 
308. See Roth, supra note 255, at 423 (explaining that the federal CWA preempts only 
nuisance laws of the complaining downstream state, but not the upstream point-source state). 
309. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484-86 (1987). 
310. See Brief for Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 52, at 4. 
311. See Lininger, supra note 255, at 195-98 (discussing federal preemption of state laws 
under the CWA); see also Roth, supra note 255, at 420-23 (discussing federal preemption of state 
laws under the CWA). 
312. Siros, supra note 93, at 289. 
313. Id. at 295-97. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
When the North Dakota Department of Health, in its capacity as an 
administrative body, carefully adheres to the proper regulations of the EPA-
delegated permit system under the CWA, there is no doubt that the State of 
North Dakota has the legal right to create and use the Sheyenne River outlet 
to combat the flooding of Devils Lake.314  The purpose of government is to 
give citizens a legal outlet to identify problems and create solutions.315  
Sometimes those means come at a cost.  As the population grows and 
humans expand further and further into their environments, there is a point 
at which man-made reconstruction of natural processes will take its toll.316  
Of course, there is always a cost-benefit analysis to be employed, but time 
and again, it seems as though the environment sees fewer of the benefits 
and much more of the cost.317 
Joseph M. Flanders∗ 
 
314. People to Save the Sheyenne River v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 38, 697 
N.W.2d 319, 333. 
315. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 9-24. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
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